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Expected Impact of the Introduction of the 
Leverage Ratio at the Hungarian and EU Level*
Beáta Kocsis – László Seregdi
From June 2021, a new set of mandatory requirements will enter into force in the 
European Union for all credit institutions registered in the EU, specifying in detail 
the method of calculating the leverage ratio and its minimum level. In this paper, 
we summarise the main criteria of leverage ratio regulation, the reasons for its 
introduction and the criticisms that have been expressed. We examine the likely 
impact of the new requirements as well as the types of credit institutions that 
may be most affected, and how the leverage ratio relates to different elements 
of the prudential regulations already in place. Through theoretical and practical 
examples, we seek to answer the question of when the leverage ratio can become 
an effective constraint on capital adequacy requirements and for which institutional 
characteristics it can function as their ideal complement. For this study, we have 
drawn on the international academic literature on the leverage ratio, analyses by 
the European Banking Authority and data available from supervisory reporting. 
We conclude that the leverage ratio in its current form does not have a significant 
impact on the majority of credit institutions in Hungary, and even at the international 
level it will primarily only represent an actual constraint for credit institutions which 
operate with a specific business model and low average risk weights. 
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Keywords: leverage ratio, banking system, prudential regulation
1. Introduction
The idea of introducing a leverage ratio as a minimum requirement emerged after 
the 2008 global financial crisis. Although similar regulations existed in the past, 
for example, in Canada and in the USA in the 1990s (Brei – Gambacorta 2014), 
comprehensive, global standards have not yet been introduced. This is surprising 
because one of the main reasons for the stricter regulation of banks compared to 
normal businesses is that, relative to other types of businesses, banks operate with 
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a significantly higher proportion of liabilities, mainly in the form of deposits, i.e. due 
to the nature of their activities, they operate with high leverage, which also entails 
higher risk. However, due to the applicable risk weights, so far restriction of the 
leverage degree has only been partially achieved via the minimum capital adequacy 
ratio requirements determined as a ratio of own funds to risk-weighted total assets.
Although the capital adequacy ratio regime uses increasingly sophisticated and risk-
sensitive methods to measure whether banks have sufficient own funds to cover 
their risks, the experience of the global financial crisis demonstrated that some 
banks were able to build up high leverage even while complying with the capital 
adequacy ratio. While at the end of the 1990s the average leverage ratio of the 
20 largest EU banks was around 6 per cent, by 2008 it had fallen to 3 per cent, i.e. 
dropped about by half, which in practice meant that the balance sheet total was 
32 times the capital. During this period, however, the Tier 1 capital ratio of these 
same banks remained stable at around 8 per cent, meaning that they were able 
to achieve this increase in leverage without affecting their risk-weighted capital 
adequacy level (ESRB 2014). Such an increase in leverage was partly driven by the 
reduction in capital requirements achieved through the use of internal models, 
and partly by the issuance of lower quality, Additional Tier 1 instruments. However, 
during the global financial crisis, it was precisely such highly-leveraged banks that 
faced financial difficulties. Excessive leverage was also identified as a major factor 
in the crisis in the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s report to the G20 
(BCBS 2010), and in the De Larosière Report (De Larosière 2009), which specifically 
examines the need for changes to the EU regime. The latter particularly stressed 
that in the case of some institutions, leverage could have been up to 60 times, which 
made these institutions especially sensitive to changes in the value of assets. If two 
banks have the same amount of own funds, any change in the value of their assets 
(e.g. due to provisions or a decrease in the market value of securities) will have 
a stronger negative impact on the bank operating with higher leverage. Therefore, 
after lengthy preliminary consultations, in 2014, the Basel Committee proposed 
the introduction of a leverage ratio, in the calculation of which, risk weights could 
be applied to assets and off-balance sheet items only in very few cases. Thus, the 
leverage ratio is less risk-sensitive than the capital adequacy ratio, but when used as 
an additional, ultimate limit, it can prevent a bank from operating with excessively 
high leverage.
The Basel Committee’s proposal was initially the object of considerable criticism, 
as – compared to the capital adequacy ratio – the leverage ratio regulation uses 
a much more primitive calculation methodology and ignores the risk management 
improvements that banks have achieved over past decades. According to the 
analogy used by Jeremy Newell (2016), General Counsel of The Clearing House 
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Association in the USA, it is like setting the same speed limit for every road in 
a country, whether it is a highway or a school zone.
Other critics argued that introduction of the leverage ratio will not result in an 
increase in banks’ own funds; moreover, there is a risk that low-risk items (especially 
retail mortgages) will become much more expensive, or be financed from outside 
the banking system through securitisation or by other actors, and such a process will 
result in higher average risk level for exposures remaining with the banking system 
(Marquardt – Blåvarg 2010), which will weaken financial stability.
If the leverage ratio were used as a stand-alone instrument, these criticisms could 
be considered valid, but with the introduction of the leverage ratio regime, the 
Basel Committee does not intend to replace capital adequacy requirements, but 
rather to complement them (backstop measure). Analysing data from EU banks, 
ECB staff examined the extent to which criticisms of the leverage ratio are valid in 
practice, and concluded that introduction of the leverage ratio itself does indeed 
encourage banks to take higher risks, but the increased capital available from the 
introduction of the leverage ratio requirement adequately outweighs this negative 
effect (Smith et al. 2017).
As raising new capital involves costs for banks, it is a logical step for them to invest 
in higher-yielding but riskier assets. However, they cannot do so indefinitely, as 
risk-weighted capital adequacy requirements will, sooner or later, prevent further 
risk-taking. At the same time, banks that are already highly-leveraged will need to 
raise additional capital to meet the requirement. Overall, therefore, introduction 
of the leverage ratio promotes a safer banking system.
In another work, Smith also argues in favour of the introduction of the leverage 
ratio on the grounds, that risk-weighted capital adequacy requirements will always 
have the shortcoming of basing the degree of risk weights on past experience. 
These may be wrong for the future (Smith 2020). Risk weights calculated from the 
models, and even those used in the standardised method, may reveal that actual 
risks have been underestimated on the basis of past events; but these errors can 
be adequately offset by the leverage ratio. So far, the main instrument to offset 
these errors in risk weighting has been the supervisory capital add-on that can be 
imposed under Pillar 2, but the introduction of the output floor will also serve this 
purpose in the future (for details, see Section 5.3.3.).
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The EU adopted the Basel recommendation on the leverage ratio with the 
amendment of CRR,1 and accordingly, compliance with the minimum requirement 
will be mandatory in the EU from 28 June 2021. Thus, the minimum level of the 
leverage ratio is defined in the EU regulation directly applicable in the member 
states, i.e. the requirement itself is not specifically defined in the Hungarian 
legislation. However, since December 2020, the Credit Institutions Act (Hpt.)2 
has been complemented by a number of regimes related to the leverage ratio, 
particularly the rules for determining the supervisory capital add-on and the capital 
guidance that may be imposed because of the risk of excessive leverage, and the 
measures to be taken in the event of non-compliance with the leverage ratio buffer 
requirement.
2. Calculation of the leverage ratio and the related minimum require-
ment
As with the capital adequacy ratio, the method for calculating the leverage ratio is 
set out in the CRR. The two types of capital requirement standards are similar in 
many cases, using similar concepts and calculation procedures (e.g. the leverage 
ratio also uses the value of T1 capital that is applied to calculate the capital 
adequacy ratio). However, there are also many important differences between 
them (see Table 1).
1  Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential 
requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
2  Act on Credit Institutions and Financial Enterprises: https://net.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid=a1300237.tv
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Table 1
Differences between the capital adequacy ratio and the leverage ratio regimes
Capital adequacy ratio Leverage ratio
Capital category 
used
Three-level: Core Tier 1 capital, Tier 1 
capital, total own funds




Detailed methodology for determining 
risk weights, with several methods for 
calculating risk weight (e.g. standardised 
method, internal models)




Total Risk Exposure Amount Total Exposure Amount
Risks considered Credit risk, market risk, operational risk, 
settlement risk, CVA
No specific risk categories are defined, 
the minimum requirement is relative to 
the amount and type of exposures
SREP capital 
requirement
Under Pillar 2, the micro-prudential 
supervisory authority may set an 
additional own funds requirement for 
any relevant risk
A capital add-on can only be imposed 
because of the risk of excessive leverage3
Capital buffers Combined macroprudential buffer 
requirement (capital conservation, 
countercyclical, G-SII, O-SII, systemic risk)
For the time being, the minimum 
leverage ratio requirement will only 
increase for G-SIIs (but later this may 
also apply to O-SIIs)
Credit institutions are already required to report to the supervisory authority on 
a quarterly basis the current value of their leverage ratio, calculated in accordance 
with the current text of the CRR. The new rules on the leverage ratio in CRR24 will 
take effect from June 2021 and, in several respects, clarify the rules used so far to 
calculate total exposure. The changes typically clarify the range of exposures to be 
taken into account in the calculation, the way they are calculated and introduce new 
exemption rules. These changes, therefore, mostly only alleviate the requirements, 
as they allow for the reduction of the total exposure amount for more assets or 
off-balance sheet items. Most of the changes made in CRR2 are aimed at alignment 
with the Basel III recommendation.
Based on the nature of the changes, for Hungarian institutions it can be stated that 
the current leverage ratio values calculated and reported under the pre-CRR2 rules 
will not be materially affected by the new regulations.
The Basel guidelines and the CRR2 set the minimum leverage ratio at 3 per cent 
of the Tier 1 capital. In order to make the leverage ratio and the capital adequacy 
3  The risk of excessive leverage, as defined in Article 4(1)(94) of the CRR, means ‘the risk resulting from an 
institution’s vulnerability due to leverage or contingent leverage that may require unintended corrective 
measures to its business plan, including distressed selling of assets which might result in losses or in valuation 
adjustments to its remaining assets’.
4  Regulation (EU) 2019/876 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 amending 
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
10 Study
Beáta Kocsis – László Seregdi
ratio comparable, this minimum level was defined in a similar way to the capital 
adequacy ratio, i.e. as the ratio between the Tier 1 capital and the total exposure 
amount. In practice, this can still lead to interpretation difficulties, as traditional 
approaches have generally interpreted the leverage ratio as the liabilities/capital 
ratio. In this approach, the higher the value, the higher the leverage, i.e. the riskier 
the operation of the institution. However, due to the peculiarities of the Basel and 
CRR calculation method, this is reversed; thus, similarly to the capital adequacy 
ratio, the higher the value of the leverage ratio, the more capitalised the institution, 
i.e. the lower the degree of leverage.
The total exposure amount determined as the denominator of the leverage ratio is 
significantly different from the total risk exposure amount used in the calculation of 
the capital adequacy ratio. In calculating the total exposure amount, all assets and 
off-balance sheet items are to be taken into account at 100 per cent value, except 
those included in Table 2.
Table 2
What should and should not be taken into account in total exposure
Assets
•  Assets that have been deducted in the calculation of Tier 1 capital (e.g. intangible assets, investments) 
may be disregarded
•  Assets should be taken into account at their value less impairment and prudent valuation
•  Credit risk mitigation factors (collaterals, guarantees) should not be taken into account in determining 
the value of assets, except for certain pre-financing or bridging loans (e.g. loan secured by building-so-
ciety savings)
•  Exposures to a parent company, a subsidiary, a sister company may be exempted upon the approval of 
the supervisory authority
•  Article 429a of the CRR2 also lists other exposures that may be exempted, e.g. guaranteed parts of 
export credits, the trade exposures of the institution to a qualifying central counterparty, fiduciary 
assets, certain exposures to central banks
Off-balance sheet items
Off-balance sheet 
items in Annex I to 
CRR
The exposure amount should be calculated according to Article 111(1) of the 
CRR, in a manner similar to the calculation of the capital adequacy ratio, except 
that a credit conversion factor of 10 per cent rather than zero should be applied 
to low-risk off-balance sheet items
Derivative 
transactions
For derivative transactions, the exposure amount under CRR2 should now be 




In the case of securities financing transactions (repo, securities lending), the 
additional risk due to counterparty credit risk must be taken into account
Credit derivatives 
sold
For sold credit derivatives, in addition to the counterparty credit risk of the trans- 
action, there is an additional credit risk due to a possible change in the credit 
quality of the underlying asset, and this risk must also be added to the total 
exposure amount
11
Expected Impact of the Introduction of the Leverage Ratio at the Hungarian and EU Level
3. Leverage ratio data at EU and Hungarian level
In its annual Risk Assessment Report, the European Banking Authority (EBA) has 
also performed a detailed analysis of data from 162 banks covering 80 per cent 
of the EU banking system. Data on the capital adequacy ratios and leverage ratios 
of these banks and similar data for credit institutions operating in Hungary are 
presented in Figure 1.
Figure 1 also shows that capital adequacy ratio and leverage ratio do not necessarily 
move together. While at the EU level, there is a clear increase in the total and 
Core Tier 1 capital ratios, the leverage ratio is essentially stagnating with small 
fluctuations. Compared to this, domestic data show a difference in that Hungary has 
a very low ratio of additional Tier 1 capital relative to the EU average, but some co-
movement can already be observed in the capital adequacy ratio and leverage ratio.
A closer look at the EU banks’ leverage ratio data also reveals that there is quite 
a wide variability in the leverage ratios of individual banks (Figure 2).
Figure 1
Capital adequacy ratios and leverage ratios of EU credit institutions compared to 
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Source: EBA (2020a):57, MNB’s credit institution data series
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Looking at the Hungarian data at the aggregate level, the values of the capital 
adequacy ratio and the leverage ratio are broadly in line, but there are a number of 
individual banking data where these values move in the opposite direction of each 
other. In addition to the increase and relative stagnation of the capital adequacy 
ratio, the leverage ratio is decreasing for banks 2, 4 and 18, while the opposite trend 
is observed for bank 6 (Figure 3).
There can be many reasons for inconsistent movements; without being exhaustive, 
let us take a few theoretical examples (Figure 4). If the institution invests its new 
funds (e.g. deposits) in low-risk assets (e.g. government securities), the capital 
adequacy ratio will show a minimal decrease or remain at the same level due to the 
low risk weight, while the leverage ratio will deteriorate significantly as it considers 
the total exposure amount. If the share of Tier 2 capital items within the own funds 
increases significantly at the expense of Tier 1 capital items, this will also cause 
a deterioration in the leverage ratio, with the capital adequacy ratio remaining 
unchanged as it takes into account the total capital.
Figure 2
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Figure 3

















































































































































































































Note: To avoid identification, banks reporting outlier values are not shown in the figure. The exact values 
are not provided for data protection reasons, and the numbering of banks is different in the different 
figures.
Source: MNB, supervisory reporting
Figure 4
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4. Leverage ratio as an effective constraint
Due to its simplified approach which ignores risk weights, the leverage ratio can be 
an ideal complement to the more complex, risk-sensitive framework of the capital 
adequacy ratio. Depending on the risk profile of the institutions, one of the two 
methodologies typically represents a stronger constraint, setting a higher minimum 
capital requirement. Regarding the capital required, the two sets of requirements 
are equal for a theoretical threshold, which can be called the critical average risk 
weight (Kenaissi – Gimpelewicz 2017).
The definition of the critical average risk weight can be derived through the example 
of a theoretical ABC bank. Let us assume that ABC bank has no Pillar 2 capital 
requirement and is not subject to any macroprudential capital buffer requirement 
other than the capital conservation buffer (CCB). Now, let us further assume that 
the exposure amount used to calculate the leverage ratio (LR) and the capital 
adequacy ratio (CAR) is the same, i.e. it has no exposures that would require or 
justify an additional requirement, a different valuation methodology or netting 
in the calculation of the leverage ratio compared to the capital adequacy ratio. 
In this simplified world, the minimum capital required under the leverage ratio 
methodology is 3 per cent of the total exposure, while for the capital adequacy, 
the minimum capital is determined by the total exposure amount multiplied by the 
average risk weight and by 8.5 per cent5 (Kenaissi – Gimpelewicz 2017).
 Leverage capital requirement = 3% · Total exposure (1)
 Capital adequacy capital requirement = 8,5% · Total exposure · RW* (2)
 Critical RW* = 3%/8,5% = 35,3% (3)
The critical average risk weight, which is the boundary between the two frameworks, 
will then be 35.3 per cent. If the institution’s average risk weight remains above 
35.3 per cent, the minimum capital required is determined by the fulfilment of 
capital adequacy requirements, upon fulfilment of which the 3 per cent minimum 
level of leverage ratio is automatically met. The leverage ratio becomes an effective 
constraint only below 35.3 per cent, at which point the higher capital requirement 
arises from meeting the 3 per cent limit (Figure 5).
5  For the sake of comparability with the leverage ratio, only the capital adequacy for Tier 1 capital is considered. 
Under the CRR, the required minimum capital adequacy is 8 per cent; for T1 capital, 75 per cent of it, i.e. 6 
per cent, plus a capital conservation buffer of 2.5 per cent.
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If we assume that the value of non-CCB buffers in the Hungarian banking sector 
ranges between 0 and 12 per cent,6 of which O-SII is 0–2 per cent7 and capital 
guidance (P2G) (in the absence of publicly available data, hypothetically) is 0–10 
per cent, and if we also assume a value between 0 and 10 per cent for Pillar 2 
capital requirements (public data are also not available here), then, based on the 
above, the critical average risk weight will be between 10.7 and 35.3 per cent 
(Figure 6).
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Per cent Per centNote: In the figure, lending activity financed from sources other than Tier 1 capital, while maintaining 
an unchanged asset mix, represents a downward shift.
Source: Compiled on the basis of Kenaissi – Gimpelewicz (2017)
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The calculated average risk weight refers to the total risk-weighted exposure 
amount, but from this the credit risk weight can also be estimated. In the 
Hungarian banking sector, the credit risk ratio within the total capital requirement 
is 86 per cent,8 and thus the leverage ratio can become effective below a level of 
approximately 30 per cent for the risk weight of an average credit risk,9 subject to 
our assumption that the above exposure amounts are the same. In the Hungarian 
banking sector, the average credit risk weight calculated according to this method 
is currently higher than this; in the period 2018–2020, it was above 43 per cent 
in each quarter. Although there were several values of around 20–30 per cent in 
the period under review for the group-level banking data, an average credit risk 
weight representing a lower effective constraint usually applies in these cases, 
due to additional buffer requirements (P2G, P2R, O-SII) on Tier 1 capital, and thus 
the minimum required level of leverage ratio, with the capital adequacy ratio, 
represents a real constraint in few cases.
8  By the end of 2019: https://www.mnb.hu/en/supervision/time-series/i-financial-institutions/credit-
institutions  
9  In this case, the calculation of the average credit risk weight: (credit risk RWA)/(exposure amount used in 
the calculation of the leverage ratio). It should be noted that, due to the assumption of equal exposure 
amounts, in the denominator, the credit risk exposure in the general sense was not taken into account.
Figure 6




























Source: Compiled on the basis of Kenaissi – Gimpelewicz (2017)
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Looking for empirical evidence of the leverage ratio becoming effective, we 
examined the relationship between Tier 1 capital adequacy,10 the leverage ratio and 
the average risk weight we defined, over the time series already used before (2018 
Q2–2020 Q3). We calculated the degree to which individual institutions exceed 
the absolute minimum of the capital adequacy requirement for Tier 1 capital (6 
per cent) and the leverage ratio requirement of 3 per cent, and then compared 
the difference between the two ratios with the average credit risk weight. If the 
outperformance ratio with regard to the capital adequacy ratio for a given institution 
is significantly higher than the excess ratio regarding the leverage ratio, then the 
leverage ratio is expected to be an effective constraint sooner, and the institution 
is in the positive quadrant of the vertical axis. Experience has shown that the lower 
the average credit risk weight of an institution, the more likely this is (Figure 7).
To illustrate this using an example: if, with respect to Tier 1 capital, an institution 
has a capital adequacy ratio of 9 per cent and a leverage ratio of only 3 per cent, it 
is constrained by the leverage ratio requirement, and in Figure 7, it is on the line y 
= 0.5 (since 9/6 – 3/3 = 0.5). According to the observed data, the lower the average 
credit risk weight of an institution, the more likely this is.
10  As before, the reason for choosing adequacy for Tier 1 capital is that only Tier 1 capital can be taken into 
account in the leverage ratio.
Figure 7
Capital adequacy and leverage ratios for Tier 1 capital in relation to average credit risk 













































Average credit risk weight
Note: The authors have taken care to preserve anonymity in the presentation. T1 CAR: capital adequacy 
for Tier 1 capital, calculation of y values (T1 CAR/6%) – (LR/3%)
Source: MNB, supervisory reporting, quarterly data for credit institutions registered in Hungary
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If the total capital adequacy ratio was used instead of the Tier 1 capital requirement, 
the correlation would be affected by the Tier 2 capital proportion, which can only 
be taken into account in the case of total capital adequacy. For banks with the same 
parameters (own funds, RWA, leverage ratio exposure, average credit risk weight), 
the higher the Tier 2 capital proportion within the own funds, the lower the leverage 
ratio will be, making it even more likely that the leverage ratio will be breached 
sooner relative to the capital adequacy ratio. However, Figure 7 would be distorted 
by the heterogeneity of the Tier 2 capital ratio across banks and the different capital 
concept of leverage and total capital adequacy ratio, so the correlation would be 
less clear.
The leverage ratio can become an effective constraint primarily if the bank’s internal 
model used in the calculation of Pillar 1 capital requirement assigns extremely 
low credit risk weights to exposures, and the bank has significant amounts of 
government securities or principally low-risk assets based on its business model. 
In many cases, mortgage banks, building societies and other individual institutions 
with a special business model fall far below the average credit risk weight of 30 per 
cent mentioned above, and thus in their case the leverage ratio is most likely to 
become effective. The role of the business model is discussed in detail in Section 5.5.
In light of the above, the minimum leverage ratio requirement is currently set at 
such a low level that it only creates an actual constraint in special cases for banks 
that are engaged in services considered low risk by the capital adequacy rules. 
During the EU Parliament’s debate on CRR2, which introduced a minimum of 3 per 
cent, there were many proposals for amendments, which would have set the floor 
significantly higher (the highest proposal was for a 10 per cent minimum).
Although the Basel Committee voted in favour of the 3 per cent minimum in its 
proposal, and this has been adopted by the EU, there are quite different views on 
determining the optimal value for the minimum requirement. Studies on this issue 
take the view that an equilibrium value must be found, at which the benefits of 
a higher leverage ratio are equal to the resulting higher costs.
The benefits of a higher leverage ratio primarily include a reduction in the likelihood 
of a banking crisis, the quantification of which depends on factors such as the 
impact of the banking crisis on reducing a country’s GDP or the persistence of 
the impact. As for the costs of a higher leverage ratio, the point here is that, as 
a result, banks have to have more capital, which makes their funding costs more 
expensive, and this is reflected in the pricing of the services they offer. Such studies 
determine the optimal leverage ratio at levels well above 3 per cent, falling in the 
range of 8–21 per cent, depending on the variables included in the calculations 
(Barth – Miller 2018).
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In light of these studies, it may seem surprising to set the minimum requirement 
at 3 per cent, but the main reason for this is that the Basel Committee intends to 
use the leverage ratio only as an additional instrument for the capital adequacy 
ratio. If we look at the regulation of the capital adequacy ratio, it is clear that, since 
its introduction in 1988, the regulation has undergone a number of tightening 
measures, including, in particular, additions regarding market and operational risk, 
the Pillar 2 capital requirement, capital buffers, tightening of the conditions for 
instruments that can be taken into account in own funds or the increase in the 
share of CET1 capital within own funds. Therefore, over the longer term, it is quite 
possible that leverage rules will also be tightened if the leverage ratio is shown to 
be an effective instrument in preventing banking crises. How the higher leverage 
ratio requirement imposed by supervisory authorities due to the risk of excessive 
leverage will work and the extent to which it can be standardised will be crucial 
in this respect. The future evolution of the leverage ratio regulation may also be 
affected by how banks react when it becomes an effective constraint, because – 
from a financial stability point of view – it makes a difference whether banks reduce 
their risks on the assets side, e.g. by selling securities or loans (deleveraging), or 
raise new capital in order to achieve compliance.
5. Other important issues related to the leverage ratio
5.1. Basel III finalisation, introduction of the G-SII capital buffer, exposures to 
central banks
At the end of 2017, the Basel Committee amended the Basel III recommendation 
in relation to a number of points, including changes to the rules for calculating the 
leverage ratio (BCBS 2017). Most of the changes have no significant impact and are 
mainly of a technical nature, including the manner in which derivatives are included 
in the total exposure amount and alignment of the exposure amount calculation of 
off-balance sheet items with the risk weights used in the calculation of the capital 
adequacy ratio. However, there were also some changes with a more significant 
impact, in particular the imposition of the G-SII11 leverage capital buffer and the 
possibility to exempt exposures to central banks.
The leverage ratio buffer requirement is half the size of the G-SII systemically 
important capital buffer. In practice, this means that if, for example, a G-SII has 
a G-SII capital buffer requirement of 1 per cent, the minimum leverage ratio will be 
3.5 per cent instead of 3 per cent. In the event of non-compliance with the leverage 
ratio buffer, the G-SII shall restrict payments (dividends, variable remuneration) 
in the same way as in the case of non-compliance with the combined buffer 
requirement. The impact of the G-SII leverage ratio buffer requirement is illustrated 
11  G-SII: Global Systemically Important Institutions
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in the figure below for a G-SII with a G-SII capital buffer requirement of 1 per cent. 
For such a bank, the minimum CET1 capital adequacy ratio requirement consists of 
the Pillar 1 minimum capital requirement (4.5 per cent), the capital conservation 
buffer requirement (2.5 per cent) and the G-SII capital buffer requirement 
(1 per cent), i.e. a total of 8 per cent. The minimum leverage ratio requirement 
will increase by half of the 1 per cent G-SII capital buffer requirement, so it will be 
[3+(1×50%) =] 3.5 per cent.
Table 3
Capital conservation ratios applicable in the event of non-compliance with CET1 
capital adequacy ratio and leverage ratio
CET1 Capital adequacy 
ratio Leverage ratio
Minimum capital conservation ratios  
(as a percentage of earnings)
4.5–5.375% 3–3.125% 100%
> 5.375–6.25% > 3.125–3.25% 80%
> 6.25–7.125% > 3.25–3.375% 60%
> 7.125–8% > 3.375–3.50% 40%
> 8.0% >3.50% 0%
Source: BCBS (2017)
Table 3 shows that if the bank in the example has a leverage ratio of 3.3 per cent, it 
shall restrict its dividend-like or variable-remuneration-like payments. The detailed 
rules on the restriction of payments are set out in the CRD12 and, on the basis of 
this, in Section 96/A of the Hpt. In essence, the bank must retain 60 per cent of its 
year-end profits, and only 40 per cent of it can be used to pay dividends or variable 
remuneration. Payment restrictions should be maintained until the bank is able to 
meet these minimum requirements.
In line with the Basel recommendation, CRR2 also introduces the leverage ratio 
buffer requirement to be met by relevant G-SIIs from 1 January 2023 (CRR2 
was originally to introduce this requirement from January 2022, but due to the 
coronavirus pandemic, both the Basel Committee and the EU extended the 
implementation deadline by one year). There are no G-SIIs in Hungary, but under the 
CRD, in the EU the Commission will have until June 2022 to examine whether the 
leverage ratio buffer requirement should be extended to O-SIIs (Other Systemically 
Important Institutions). If the Commission proposes an extension, the EU Parliament 
and the Council may decide that the leverage ratio buffer requirement must also 
be met by O-SIIs. This would currently mean a higher leverage ratio requirement 
for eight institutions in Hungary.
12  Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the 
activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms
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Under the CRR2 leverage ratio regulation, national supervisory authorities may, in 
special circumstances, allow institutions not to include certain exposures to the 
central bank in the total exposure amount for a maximum period of one year. The 
consequence of this exemption, however, is that if a bank elects for the exemption 
for central bank exposures, the leverage ratio requirement will increase, i.e. the 
bank will have to meet a higher level than 3 per cent, and the degree of the higher 
requirement will depend on the amount of the exempted exposure.
The 2020 CRR ‘quick fix’ amendments to mitigate the economic impact of the 
coronavirus pandemic allowed national authorities to make use of this option 
even before the entry into force in June 2021. In fact, the ECB published its 
decision on this matter in September 2020.13 Given that the minimum leverage 
ratio requirement is not yet in force until June 2021, this has mainly helped ECB-
supervised institutions to disclose more favourable leverage ratio data.
5.2. Supervisory capital add-on requirement
From December 2020, a new supervisory instrument in the CRD V14 (and in the Hpt. 
implementing it) is that the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (the Central Bank of Hungary, 
MNB) can formulate an additional own funds requirement and capital guidance 
for institutions in the event of excessive leverage risk. This capital requirement and 
capital guidance can be applied in addition to the capital requirement previously 
imposed under the SREP, and in practice means that the MNB sets a minimum for 
the institution, higher than the 3 per cent leverage ratio.
However, the capital add-on requirement imposed due to excessive leverage risk 
cannot be reflected in the supervisory capital add-on requirement on the 8 per 
cent risk-weighted asset value under the SREP, as due to the excessive leverage 
risk, only an imposition of an add-on on the leverage ratio can be formulated. Thus, 
in the case of the leverage ratio and the capital adequacy ratio, similar regulatory 
and supervisory instruments operate (Pillar 1 minimum requirement, capital buffer, 
supervisory capital add-on requirement, capital guidance), but these two sets of 
requirements operate in parallel, and there is no overlap between them. This new 
instrument may be particularly effective in countries with banks where the leverage 
ratio is an effective constraint.
5.3. Relationship with other prudential regulatory instruments
The current instruments for the prudential regulation of banks have evolved in 
a long process. Today, they can be said to form a coherent system that covers a wide 
range of banking activities and associated risks. At the same time, the business 
model, the market environment and the relevant risks associated with the activities 
13  https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2020/html/ssm.pr200917~eaa01392ca.en.html 
14  Directive (EU) 2019/878 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 amending Directive 
2013/36/EU 
22 Study
Beáta Kocsis – László Seregdi
will affect which regulatory instrument is a bottleneck for a given bank. Most 
recently, the Basel Committee used year-end 2017 data to examine which prudential 
regulatory instrument was the most difficult for the 128 banks in the sample to 
meet (BCBS 2019). The survey found that the Tier 1 capital ratio was the strongest 
regulatory constraint for 35 per cent of banks, the NSFR (Net Stable Funding Ratio) 
for 15 per cent, the TLAC (Total Loss Absorbing Capacity, under the CRR: MREL15) 
for 12 per cent, the leverage ratio for 11 per cent and the LCR (Liquidity Coverage 
Ratio) for 6 per cent. As can be seen, while the leverage ratio is not the strongest 
regulatory instrument, it was still the strongest regulatory constraint for 11 per cent 
of banks. The leverage ratio regime is closely linked (in addition to capital adequacy) 
to other regulatory instruments, including, among others, the LCR rules, a possible 
future limitation of sovereign risks, the output floor and the MREL requirements, 
which also affect the effectiveness of the leverage ratio regime.
5.3.1. LCR
The Liquidity Coverage Ratio can be used to measure whether the bank holds 
a sufficient quantity and quality of liquid assets for the eventuality of a short-term 
(30-day) liquidity stress.16 The denominator of the ratio is the weighted amount 
of expected outflows within 30 days in the event of stress, and its numerator is 
the weighted amount of available liquid assets.17 Changes in the LCR may in some 
cases explain different movements in the capital adequacy ratio and the leverage 
ratio. If a bank invests its funds in government securities or other low-risk liquid 
assets to increase its liquidity, this may cause the LCR numerator to rise, while in 
capital adequacy, exposure with a 0 per cent or low risk weight causes no, or (in 
the case of a low positive weight) only a small, change. However, in the calculation 
of the leverage ratio, the same exposure is taken into account at full value, and 
it reduces its value. Of course, in this theoretical example, the movement of the 
LCR is considered in a very simplified way; only one component of it is considered. 
In addition to changes in liquid assets, the development of net outflows also 
plays a role in the evolution of the ratio, both via changes in the bank’s liability 
structure (due to different outflow weights of liabilities) and via the development of 
inflows.
15  MREL – Minimum Requirement for Own Funds and Eligible Liabilities
16  https://www.mnb.hu/en/financial-stability/macroprudential-policy/the-macroprudential-toolkit/
instruments-addressing-liquidity-and-financing-risks 
17  The weights used for the calculation of the LCR are set out in Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 
2015/61, a text with EEA relevance supplementing Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament 
and the Council with regard to liquidity coverage requirement for credit institutions.
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Movements in a direction similar to the above example (the LCR is rising, and the 
capital adequacy ratio and the leverage ratio are moving apart) are observed in the 
periods marked for banks 6, 7 and 14, while for banks 15 and 16, we can see that 
with the LCR decline, the capital adequacy ratio and the leverage ratio are moving 
closer together (Figure 8).
Although the primary purpose of introducing the leverage ratio is to ensure that 
banks have an adequate capital position, its impact on maintaining solvency cannot 
be entirely neglected either. As the leverage ratio requirement sets a threshold 
with regard to the Tier 1 capital minimum, it increases the proportion of funds 
that cannot be withdrawn in the event of a crisis and are available safely and 
permanently even in the case of a bank run.
Figure 8

























































































































































































Note: To avoid identification, banks reporting outlier values are not shown in the figure. The exact values 
are not provided for data protection reasons, and the numbering of banks is different in the different 
figures.
Source: MNB, supervisory reporting
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5.3.2. Sovereign risks
As the global financial crisis highlighted the dangers of too close a relationship 
between commercial banks and states, regulatory authorities — in particular the 
Basel Committee — have already made several attempts to restrict banks’ sovereign 
exposures, i.e. risk-takings, mainly in the form of government securities or other 
forms of financing, towards individual states. The Basel Committee also published 
a separate discussion paper on this subject (BCBS 2018). In it, among other things, 
it suggested increasing the risk weight of sovereign exposures, imposing a capital 
add-on in the case of excessive concentration of sovereign risk exposures or possibly 
revising the exemption from large-exposure limit. In the end, however, no specific 
proposal was made for limiting sovereign risk exposures; nevertheless, it can be 
stated that the introduction of the leverage ratio is also partly suitable for limiting 
sovereign risk exposures. Namely, while these exposures are assigned a 0 or very 
low risk weight in the calculation of the capital adequacy ratio, in the leverage ratio, 
they have a 100 per cent weight in the calculation of the total exposure amount. 
Accordingly, a bank with a large proportion of government securities on its balance 
sheet is more likely to run into the 3 per cent leverage ratio limit than the minimum 
capital adequacy ratio requirement of 8 per cent. 
5.3.3. Output floor
In December 2017, the Basel Committee further refined its recommendations on 
the prudential regime for banks, and in this context, it reintroduced a previously 
used instrument, the output floor. The output floor is designed to limit the capital 
requirement reduction — available through internal models — in the case of banks 
using internal models, in proportion to the capital requirement calculated under 
the standardised method.
In practice, this means that banks using internal models (basic or advanced internal 
rating-based approach) to calculate the credit risk capital requirement must also 
continue to calculate their capital requirement under the credit risk standardised 
method, and their final credit risk capital requirement should not be less than 72.5 
per cent of the capital requirement calculated under the standardised method, 
even if internal model calculations resulted in a lower capital requirement. One 
of the main reasons for the introduction of the output floor was that the capital 
requirement calculations of banks using internal models showed significant 
differences in practice, and the capital requirement differences could not always be 
justified by empirical facts (e.g. portfolio PD differences, different business models).
Since the output floor limits the capital requirement reduction available to banks 
using internal models, and thus the average credit risk weight of the portfolio as 
a whole as well, it reduces the actual restrictive role of the leverage ratio. The 
leverage ratio is an actual constraint mainly for banks operating with low credit risk 
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weights, while the output floor limits the extent to which the average risk weight 
can be reduced for banks using internal models.
This link has been identified and confirmed by the EBA Basel III monitoring reports 
(EBA 2020b). Analyses by the EBA showed that, without the application of the 
output floor, the capital adequacy requirements calculated by risk weights were 
the more stringent constraint for 71.7 per cent of the banks surveyed, while the 
leverage ratio was the more stringent regulatory instrument for 28.3 per cent of the 
banks.18 When the output floor is implemented, these ratios change as follows: the 
share of banks for which the capital adequacy ratio is the more stringent constraint 
remains at 71.7 per cent, the share of banks for which the leverage ratio is the 
constraint decreases to 12.3 per cent, and the share of banks for which the output 
floor will be the more stringent constraint is 16 per cent. The gradual introduction 
of the output floor from 2023 will therefore reduce the proportion of banks for 
which the leverage ratio is the actual constraint.
5.3.4. MREL requirement standard
The close relationship between the leverage ratio and the MREL is illustrated by 
the fact that the CRR set the minimum requirements for own funds and eligible 
liabilities for global systemically important institutions at 18 per cent of the risk-
based calculated total risk exposure amount used to calculate the capital adequacy 
ratio, on the one hand, but at 6.75 per cent of the non-risk-based calculated total 
exposure amount used in the calculation of the leverage ratio on the other hand. 
As a consequence of this dual set of requirements, there may be banks for which 
the actual MREL requirement will not be the total risk exposure amount, but rather 
the value calculated on the basis of the non-risk-based total exposure amount. 
The level of the MREL requirement is thus also affected by the amount of leverage 
a bank is operating with.
Although there are no global systemically important institutions in Hungary, and 
the minimum MREL level for credit institutions is set by the resolution authority, 
the total exposure amount also has an impact on MREL compliance for these 
credit institutions. This is because, pursuant to the Resolution Directive19 and the 
Resolution Act20 implementing it in Hungary, the resolution authority sets the 
minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities not only in proportion 
to the total risk exposure but also to the total exposure. Consequently, an increase 
in the total exposure amount may result in an increase in the minimum MREL level.
18  The EBA’s analysis also notes that the role of leverage ratio in this example is overestimated, as only the 
Pillar 1 requirements have been taken into account for capital adequacy requirements, which, in practice, 
are complemented by the Pillar 2 capital requirement and the capital buffer requirements.
19  Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a 
framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms
20  Act XXXVII of 2014 on the Development of the Institutional Framework Intended to Enhance the Security 
of Members of the Financial Intermediary System
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5.4. Further decline in the role of Tier 2 capital
Following the global financial crisis, there has been a clear regulatory trend towards 
reducing the role of Tier 2 capital that banks can take into account in own funds. 
One important lesson of the global financial crisis was that in the settlement of 
losses, Tier 2 capital items have only a limited capacity to absorb losses. This is 
partly because Tier 2 capital, unlike other own funds, may have maturity, and partly 
because it can actually be used to settle losses only in the event of liquidation of 
the bank.
Instruments that can be considered Tier 2 capital are usually subordinated loans 
with an original maturity of more than five years, where the lender agrees to be 
ranked last in the order of priority, senior to shareholders, in the event of liquidation 
of the bank. Although this provision poses a significant risk for the lender, as its 
claim is subordinated to that of other creditors, it also means that the bank can 
only use such an instrument in a liquidation procedure to settle losses.
This set of requirements was developed back at a time when banking crisis 
management procedures were quite underdeveloped and the main purpose of 
the regulation was to repay depositors their money even in the event of liquidation 
of the bank. However, the current banking regulation has recognised that winding 
up a bank is a long, costly process, which usually causes more losses than rescuing 
the bank as part of a comprehensive resolution process.
Regulatory changes over the past decade have therefore been geared towards 
improving the resolvability of banks (resolution authority and fund, setting minimum 
requirement for MREL liabilities). In such an approach, it is evident that the role of 
Tier 2 capital items in regulation should decline and that of higher-quality capital 
items should increase. This transformation is reflected in several regulatory items: 
its clearest item is the setting of minimum requirements for Core Tier 1 capital (4.5 
per cent) and Tier 1 capital (6 per cent) within the capital adequacy ratio, as a result 
of which only one quarter of the total minimum requirement of 8 per cent can be 
covered with Tier 2 capital.
This decline in the role of Tier 2 capital is also reflected in the fact that the minimum 
leverage ratio requirement of 3 per cent — similarly to the basis of the large-
exposure limit — has been set in proportion to the Tier 1 capital. The new prudential 
requirements for leverage ratio and large exposures to be met from June 2021 will 
therefore further reduce the role of Tier 2 capital, thereby encouraging banks to 
seek to include in their operation new capital instruments that can also be used to 
write off losses on a going concern basis.
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5.5. The role of the business model
Prior to the EU implementation of the Basel leverage ratio in the CRR, the EBA 
assessed the expected impact of its introduction and published a detailed report 
on the subject (EBA 2016). In that report, the EBA also discussed the business 
models for which it may be worth considering setting specific rules for banks in 
respect of calculating the leverage ratio. One such special business model is that 
of mortgage banks, which operate with a much lower average risk weight than 
commercial banks, as the loans they provide are mortgage-backed and thus have 
a low risk weight. Of the 12 mortgage banks in the sample at the time, in 2016, 
five still had leverage ratios below 3 per cent and another five had leverage ratios 
below 5 per cent.
As preliminary impact assessments showed that introducing the leverage ratio could 
be the most restrictive for the activities of mortgage banks, it was also suggested 
that a leverage ratio requirement of less than 3 per cent be set for mortgage banks, 
but this proposal was ultimately rejected.
The same EBA report also revealed that there is another business model that is 
more burdened than average by the leverage ratio requirement. Public development 
banks also operate with a low average risk weight, partly due to their client base and 
partly because of the public guarantee schemes related to their activities. Under 
the CRR2, such institutions are also not exempted from the leverage ratio regulation 
and not subject to a lower minimum requirement, but are nevertheless granted 
a significant relief: in calculating the total exposure amount, a public development 
credit institution21 does not need to take into account its claims on central 
governments, regional governments, local authorities or public sector entities in 
relation to public sector investments and promotional loans. Thus, regulating the 
leverage ratio cannot be a barrier to public sector development.
The 2016 EBA report on the leverage ratio contained a proposal for exempting 
central counterparties and central securities depositories operating as credit 
institutions from the leverage ratio regulation, but in the end the CRR only 
included the special feature that the initial margin on centrally-cleared derivative 
transactions received by institutions from their clients which they pass on to central 
counterparties should be excluded from the total exposure amount.
21  This type of institution is defined in detail in Article 429a(2) of the CRR.
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5.6. Disclosure
Ever since the Basel II recommendation introduced disclosure requirements as the 
third pillar of the regulation in 2004, it has become common for the introduction of 
a new prudential rule to be accompanied by an extension of disclosure rules. Under 
the CRR, banks were already required to disclose data on the leverage ratio prior 
to the introduction of the 3 per cent minimum. Under the CRR2, credit institutions 
are required to disclose their leverage ratio and the total exposure amount on 
a semi-annual basis, and large institutions are also required to disclose the details 
of the calculation of the ratio.
5.7. The leverage ratio as an alternative regulatory approach
While the leverage ratio is a backstop-type instrument under the Basel Committee 
guidelines and the EU regulation, in the USA, the leverage ratio is also used as 
an alternative regulatory instrument. Since 1 January 2020, community banks 
supervised by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve, 
and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation have been allowed by law to comply 
only with the leverage ratio requirement, instead of the complex capital adequacy 
requirements calculated on the basis of risk weights. This option is available to 
banks where:
•  the consolidated balance sheet total is below USD 10 billion;
•  the ratio of off-balance sheet items to total assets is below 25 per cent; and
•  the leverage ratio is above 9 per cent (temporarily reduced to 8 per cent due to 
the pandemic, with a minimum requirement of 9 per cent only from 2022).
This procedure is beneficial for banks because it makes it much cheaper for these 
institutions to comply with the legislation; they do not have to calculate their capital 
adequacy ratio using detailed rules and report it to the supervisory authority. In the 
event that a bank’s leverage ratio falls below 9 per cent, the bank will be subject to 
a two-quarter transition period until it either brings its leverage ratio back to the 
required level or returns to the regulatory framework for the capital adequacy ratio.
This US measure is not contrary to the recommendations of the Basel Committee, 
as it only applies to large, internationally significant banks anyway. This option is 
available to a very high number of banks; based on the 2019 Q2 data, 4,581, i.e. 
85 per cent of the 5,382 banks operating in the USA may have been able to meet 
the set of simplified compliance requirements (Loudis et al. 2020). Moreover, the 
financial developments in recent years have resulted in a trend of steady increase 
in the leverage ratio of US banks and overall, for 97 per cent of the banks eligible 
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to join, the higher leverage ratio requirement of 9 per cent has resulted in a higher 
capital requirement than the capital adequacy requirements calculated on the basis 
of risk weights, so the transition also does not lead to a weakening of financial 
stability.
While this new system seems to be favourable for US banks, according to the data 
from September 2020, only less than a third of banks eligible to join had so far 
made use of the simplified compliance option. The main reason for this was that 
they found the resulting cost savings insufficient and the large inflow of deposits 
had reduced their leverage ratio and made their ability to meet the minimum 
requirement on a sustained basis uncertain (Duren – Clark 2020).
By using the new direction and its experience, in the longer term, even EU policy-
makers may consider the possibility of moving to a simplified capital requirement 
regulation, as in the EU there are also a great many small institutions for which 
a simpler calculation method could lead to cost savings. For example, only six22 
of the banking groups operating in Hungary have a balance sheet total of more 
than HUF 3,000 billion (USD 10 billion), i.e. such a measure could mean simpler 
requirements for many banks in Hungary as well; furthermore, in a number of other 
EU countries (especially in those with smaller cooperative banks), this may mean 
an even higher ratio to the number of banks.
6. Summary
The introduction of the leverage ratio is one of the several regulatory responses 
to the global financial crisis. From June 2021, the set of EU requirements based 
on the recommendations of the Basel Committee will be a mandatory minimum 
requirement in Hungary as well, under the directly applicable EU regulation. 
The leverage ratio requirement in its current form only complements the capital 
adequacy requirements calculated on the basis of risk weights, but it seems to be 
an effective instrument to prevent banks from becoming overleveraged, thereby 
improving the resilience of the banking system and strengthening financial stability. 
The leverage ratio is also closely linked to other instruments of prudential regulation, 
in particular liquidity requirements, MREL requirements and the output floor, and 
can effectively contribute to appropriately correcting for possible underestimation 
of risks in the calculation of the capital adequacy ratio. However, regulators should 
also bear in mind that while an excessively high leverage ratio requirement may be 
effective in raising the level of own funds in the banking system, it may contribute to 
financial services becoming more expensive or to their moving outside the banking 
22  Based on the data from 31 December 2020
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system, and thus the minimum level of leverage ratio should only be changed on 
the basis of thorough impact studies.
The business model of banks has a significant impact on how they are affected by 
the introduction of the new requirement. The leverage ratio is expected to be an 
actual constraint for banks operating with a low average risk weight and a significant 
proportion of Tier 2 capital. These banks can achieve compliance with the new 
requirement primarily by raising a new Tier 1 capital or by changing their business 
model. Other measures related to the leverage ratio, in particular the methods 
for supervisory imposition of capital add-on and capital guidance due to the risk 
of excessive leverage, are still under development; thus, the actual impact of the 
leverage ratio can be effectively estimated once these supervisory procedures are in 
place and integrated into the supervisory processes. It is quite possible that through 
the use of practical experience even the leverage ratio regime will change in the 
future so that this new requirement can act as an effective constraint for a wider 
range of banks to curb excessive risk-taking. The changes may not only concern the 
minimum level of leverage ratio, as – in their own right – the changes to certain 
detailed rules for the calculation method (e.g. exemptions from inclusion in total 
exposure amount) may also be such as to allow regulatory authorities to influence 
the way banks operate.
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